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The Yankee Woman In King Arthur's 
Court-What The United States and The 
United Kingdom Can Learn From Each 
Other About Sexual Harassment Lawt 
Toni P. Lester 
INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment is an on-the-job hazard faced by working 
women everywhere. l One study of approximately 8,500 American 
federal government workers showed that almost one-half of the 
women respondents reported having been subjected to sexual har-
assment.2 The problem is not limited to women in the U.S. labor 
market. A recent report published by the International Labor Or-
ganization disclosed that a significant number of women in other 
western countries also have experienced some form of workplace 
sexual harassmen t. 3 
t Copyright © 1994 Toni P. Lester. 
* Asst Prof. of Law, Johnson Term Chairholder and former Dill International Research 
Fellow (Babson College); (Georgetown University); Juris Doctor (Georgetown University Law 
Center). The author wishes to thank Alice Leonard, Deputy General Counsel for the U.K. 
Equal Opportunities Commission, and Tess Gill, barrister and member of the European 
Economic Community's Equal Opportunity Unit, for their advice on U.K. and EEC law. An 
earlier version of the EC law section of this article was presented at the Critical Legal Studies 
Conference held at New College in Oxford in 1993. A portion of that version, entitled, The 
European Economic Community's Code of Conduct On Sexual Harassment-Will It Help Or Hurt 
Harassment Victims? was published in London by the NEW LAw JOURNAL in October, 1993. 
I Although both men and women can be harassed sexually, women appear to be harassed 
more often than men. See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the 
Federal Government: An Update 2 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Merit Report]. Forty-two percent 
of the women and 14% of the male respondents reported being subjected to some kind of 
sexual harassment These results were virtually the same as the results of an earlier study 
conducted by the same agency. See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment 
in the Federal Workplace, Is it a Problem ?-A Report of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 
2-3 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Merit Report] (Out of 23,000 federal government workers 
surveyed, 42% of the women and 15% of the male respondents reported being sexually 
harassed). This Article, therefore, will focus on the sexual harassment of women. 
21988 Merit Report, supra note 1, at 3. 
3 Combatting Sexual Harassment At Work, 285-289 International Labour Office (Geneva: 
1992). 
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Sexual harassment particularly is pervasive in the United King-
dom, one of the European Community's (EC) mostimportantmem-
ber nations. One study indicated that 73 percent of the 46,000 
women who worked for private and public sector U.K. organizations 
reported having been sexually harassed.4 Other U.K. studies have 
reported equally disturbing results.5 
When women are sexually harassed, they often become depressed, 
take sick leave, and fail to be productive at work.6 Some remain silent 
because they fear that their complaints will not be taken seriously, 
or that they will be reprimanded.7 Others do complain about the 
problem and ultimately may sue their employers for failing to pro-
tect them from the harassment. Courts today can award substantial 
compensatory and punitive money damages to women who win 
harassment lawsuits. 8 
Despite the psychological harm experienced by harassment vic-
tims and the monetary costs to companies who fail to prevent it, 
many businesses still lack sufficient policies to ensure that harass-
ment does not occur. This leaves employers vulnerable to lawsuits 
and loss of public goodwill. Furthermore, qualified women become 
wary of working for such employers. 
Sexual harassment also is viewed as a major international human 
rights problem. Laws prohibiting it have been in existence in the 
United States since the 1970s, and major international organizations 
like the EC also have condemned it. Although compared to the 
4Jimmy Burns, Managers 'Seen As Arrogant,' FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1987, § I, at 8. 
5 See Preliminary Report by NAS/Uwr (1987) cited in MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, DIGNITY OF 
WOMEN AT WORK: A REpORT ON THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MEMBER 
STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 157 (1987) [hereinafter DIGNITY OF WOMEN] (72% 
of the female secondary school teachers questioned in one survey, and 96% of the women 
holding non-traditional women's jobs in another survey reported having been sexually har-
assed); see also Stewart Tendler, Police Chiefs Start Drive To Wipe Out Sex Harassment, THE 
TIMEs,Jan. 22, 1993, at 5 (harassment ranging from physical abuse to bad language and sexual 
innuendo was endured by many female officers); see generaUy Working Conditions-Sexual 
Harassment, Labour Research, Sept. 1983. 
61988 Merit Report, supra note 1, at 39-42; see Commission Recommendation of 27 Nov. 
1991 On The Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work, 1992 OJ. (L. 49) 3 
[hereinafter EEC Recommendation]. "It has a direct impact on the profitability of the 
enterprise where ... employees' productivity is reduced by having to work in a climate in 
which an individual's integrity is not respected." [d. 
7 See Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1506 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
8 This is especially true in the United States, where the Civil Rights Act Amendments of 
1991 enable harassment victims to win up to $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a)-(b) (1993). 
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United States, European harassment law is still in its infancy, impor-
tant developments already have begun to take place in countries like 
the United Kingdom. As such, the United Kingdom promises to play 
a major role in the development of European harassment law. 
As the business community becomes more globalized, the need 
to address the problem of sexual harassment is even more critical. 
There are over 2,000 U.S.-based multinational companies operating 
in the United Kingdom,9 and approximately 1,200 U.K. parent com-
panies with manufacturing operations in the United States.lO Man-
agers in these companies need to develop sexual harassment policies 
that reflect the laws of both countries. Their employees also need 
to know what rights and responsibilities they have concerning sexual 
harassment. Furthermore, other multinational companies that have 
operations in the United States and the United Kingdom, also can 
benefit from learning about U.S. and U.K. sexual harassment law. 
Employees of these multinational corporations certainly will benefit 
as well. 
These two countries can make their own laws more effective by 
examining their counterparts overseas. Part I of this Article discusses 
U.S. and U.K. statutory and case law definitions of sexual harass-
ment, the different remedies that are available to sexual harassment 
victims, and how employer liability issues are addressed in each 
country. Where appropriate, aspects of EC law that effect U.K. sex-
ual harassment law is examined. 
Part II suggests how the laws can be changed to combat sexual 
harassment in each country more effectively. Part II also proposes a 
plan of action for companies wishing to eliminate sexual harass-
ment. This Article concludes that at the very minimum, multina-
tional companies should adopt harassment policies that synthesize 
the highest common principles inherent in the legal and ethical 
systems of all the countries in which they operate. Policies that fail 
to accomplish this objective ultimately do a disservice to both em-
ployers and employees alike. 
9 Interview with S. Mukherjee, Membership Department of the American Chamber of 
Commerce, in the United Kingdom (May 21,1993) (there are 460 U.S. members of the U.K. 
Chamber of Commerce and 2,070 non-member U.S. companies operating in the United 
Kingdom). 
IOjEFFREY S. ARPAN & DAVID A. RICKS, DIRECTORY OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES xxi (5th ed. 1993). 
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I. COMPARING U.S. AND U.K. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw 
A. U.S. Statutory and Administrative Agenry Definitions of Sexual 
Harassment 
U.S. statutory law does not prohibit sexual harassment in employ-
ment specifically. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 
which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, 
religion, national origin, and sex,l1 however, has been interpreted 
as a prohibition on workplace sexual harassment. The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities Commission (USEEOC), the federal agency 
charged with enforcing Title VII, first acknowledged that sexual 
harassment was illegal under Title VII in 1980. At that time, the 
USEEOC issued guidelines (U.S. Guidelines) that defined sexual 
harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. "12 
Furthermore, conduct has to have (1) been made a term or condi-
tion of employment or (2) had the purpose or effect of creating a 
hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment. I3 Although the 
U.S. Guidelines do not carry the force of law, the courts generally 
have relied upon them to adjudicate harassment c1aims.I4 
B. U.S. Case Law Definition of Sexual Harassment 
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment vs. Hostile Environment 
Harassment that has been made a term or condition of employ-
ment, commonly called "quid pro quo" harassment, occurs when a 
supervisor expressly demands that an employee have sex with him 
either (1) in exchange for ajob benefit (i.e., being hired or getting 
promoted) or (2) to prevent a job detriment (i.e., being fired).15 
U.S. courts recognize that the sexual blackmail inherent in supervi-
sor quid pro quo harassment should be condemned. I6 
11 For a discussion of the legislative and political history of Title VII's sex discrimination 
provision, see CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LoNGEST DEBATE-A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-19 (1985). 
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1990). 
13 [d. 
B See Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424,433-34 (1971) and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)); see also 
Bushey v. N.YC. Civ. Servo Comm., 733 F.2d 220, 225 (2d Cir. 1984). 
15 Downs V. FAA, 755 F.2d 288, 290-91 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 
908 (11th Cir. 1982). 
16 For an example of one of the earliest cases to take this view, see Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 
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In the United States, it generally is believed that quid pro quo 
harassment cannot be perpetrated by co-workers because co-workers 
have no direct authority to make decisions that positively or nega-
tively effect the job status of other employees. Co-worker harassment 
is instead characterized as a form of "hostile environment" harass-
ment. 
Hostile environment harassment can occur when a woman is 
subjected to sexually-charged remarks, obscene gestures, or unwanted 
touching on the part of a co-worker.17 Some courts have found that 
pornographic displays in the workplace can be a form of hostile 
environment harassment. IS In addition to co-worker harassment, any 
type of supervisor harassment that does not involve quid pro quo 
harassment is considered a form of hostile environment harass-
ment.19 
Initially, many courts did not find hostile environment harassment 
actionable under Title VII. The typical assumption was that hostile 
environment harassment was not as serious as quid pro quo harass-
ment because it could not cause the type of tangible job losses that 
were associated with quid pro quo harassment. Michael Rubenstein, 
noted expert on U.K. and EC sexual harassment law, stated that the 
inherent flaw in this point of view is that it leaves "the woman against 
whom no retaliation has been taken with no recourse against the 
harassment .... It would permit a woman to be sexually harassed 
with impunity."20 
The distinction between quid pro quo harassment and hostile 
environment harassment thus is not simply a rhetorical one. Using 
an approach that is somewhat analogous to how antitrust violations 
are evaluated in the United States, courts tend to treat quid pro quo 
harassment as if it were per se illegal under Title VII. Hostile envi-
ronment harassment is treated as if it were subject to a more bur-
densome rule of reason evaluative standard. Thus, if a plaintiff is 
able to show that she was the subject of unwelcome sexual blackmail 
983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) where an employee's job was abolished after she rejected her 
supervisor's suggestion that she might receive ajob benefit if she would submit to his sexual 
advances. See also Downs, 775 F.2d at 290; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-68. 
17 See DIGNITY OF WOMEN, supra note 5, at 51; see also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-47 (1979). 
18 See Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 472, 476 (5th Cir. 1989); Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1495. 
19 See Waltman, 875 F.2d at 472,476; Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1495. 
20 MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SERVICE, PREVENTING AND REMEDYING 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK 11 (1989) [hereinafter PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT). 
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on the part of her supervisor, she might be able to sustain a claim 
for quid pro harassment without having to submit additional evi-
dence. If the same plaintiff merely is subjected to unwanted de-
mands for sex from a co-worker, however, proof of the co-worker's 
conduct is not conclusive to sustain a hostile environment claim 
against her employer. 
Even if the plaintiff in the latter case could show that she decided 
to leave her job in order to avoid being harassed by her co-worker, 
this still would not convince most courts that she suffered a sig-
nificant job detriment to characterize the co-worker's behavior as 
quid pro quo harassment. She instead would have to prove that the 
co-worker's behavior was sufficiently unreasonable and offensive. 
These concepts, in turn, are subject to a great deal of subjective 
interpretation. 
Some legal commentators argue that courts tend to apply sexist 
preconceptions about male-female behavior to define what consti-
tutes offensive or unreasonable conduct.21 They maintain that much 
of what would be considered unreasonable and offensive to most 
women traditionally has been dismissed as trivial by a predominantly 
male judiciary.22 In the 1986 case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,23 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Title VII prohibited hostile 
environment harassment. Because the Court defined hostile envi-
ronment harassment in an open-ended manner, however, some lower 
courts continued to trivialize hostile environment harassment claims. 
2. Meritor Saving Bank v. Vinson 
In Mentor, a bank teller named Michele Vinson, claimed that she 
was coerced into having a sexual relationship with her supervisor.24 
Vinson stated that she engaged in the relationship because she was 
afraid that she would lose her job if she did not comply with her 
supervisor's demands.25 The supervisor apparently never expressly 
threatened to fire Vinson, as a result, the Court characterized his 
conduct as hostile environment harassment.26 
21 See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. LegalDefinitions, 13 HARV. 
WOMEN'S LJ. 35, 70 n.134 (1990). 
22 Id. 
23 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
24 Id. at 70. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 59-60. 
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Strongly condemning the harassment that Vinson experienced, 
the Supreme Court found that Vinson's allegations, "which in-
clud[ed] not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct 
of the most serious nature- [were] plainly sufficient to state a claim 
for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment."27 The Court further 
stated that hostile environment harassment occurs when the harass-
ment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive ... to 'create an abusive 
working environment."'28 Because the Supreme Court did not limit 
its definition to supervisor hostile environment harassment, lower 
courts have applied the definition to co-worker harassment claims. 
The U.S. Guidelines definition of hostile environment harassment 
clearly influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor. Critics 
of the decision, however, believe that by using the words "severe" 
and "abusive" to expand the USEEOC definition of harassment, the 
Court implicitly endorsed an undue focus on the effects of the 
harassment on the victim. The Court instead could have focused on 
the impropriety of the harasser's conduct. 29 
For instance, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company,30 the court 
of appeals relied on Meritor to conclude that the plaintiff had not 
been able to prove that the co-worker's conduct sufficiently inter-
fered with the work performance of a "reasonable person under like 
circumstances."31 The court also characterized company displays of 
pornography and a co-worker's repeated vulgarities as "annoying ... 
[but] not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the 
plaintiff or other female employees."32 
This quote implies that judicial relief only should be granted when 
harassment has caused a victim to have a nervous breakdown or to 
seek long-term psychological care. Some courts, like the Ninth Cir-
27Id. at 67. 
28 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982». 
29For a discussion of the way in which the expanded definition of hostile environment 
harassment has had the potential to thwart harassment victim litigants, see Toni Lester, The 
Reasonable Woman Test In Sexual Harassment Law, IND. L. REv. 227, 238-40 (1993) [herein-
after Reasonable Woman Test]; see also Pollack, supra note 21, at 62 (Mentor allowed courts to 
view harassment "through the eyes of the perpetrator" as opposed to the perspective of the 
victim). 
3°805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
31Id. at 620 (emphasis added); see also Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 
1986) (declaring that unwanted touching by one co-worker, personalized vulgarities from 
another co-worker, and sexually suggestive comments from a superior also did not constitute 
sexual harassment). 
32 805 F.2d at 622 (emphasis added). 
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cuit Court of Appeals,33 rejected Rabidue on the grounds that it 
should have focused more on another issue, the impropriety of the 
conduct under review. 34 Mter several years of debate among the 
lower courts, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc. 35 
3. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 
In Harris, the district court found that a company president sub-
jected a female manager to "a continuing pattern of sex-based de-
rogatory conduct."36 In the presence of other employees, the presi-
dent called the manager "a dumb ass woman" and stated that the 
two of them should go to a hotel to discuss her raise. 37 Citing 
Rabidue, the court concluded that the president's comments were 
not "so severe as to be expected to seriously affect the plaintiffs 
psychological well-being. "38 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court's 
decision. It ruled that "as long as the environment would reasonably 
be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive ... , there is no 
need for it also to be psychologically injurious."39 Justice O'Connor, 
writing for the majority, said that psychological harm is one factor, 
among many, that should be considered by the courts.40 Other fac-
tors include the frequency of the harassment, whether it was "physi-
cally threatening," or a "mere offensive utterance."41 
The Court's rejection of Rabidue's psychological harm require-
ment can be considered a major victory for harassment victims. The 
Court, however, left unanswered another equally important ques-
tion, the extent to which the "reasonable woman/victim" test should 
replace the "reasonable person" test as an evaluative standard in 
harassment law. The reasonable woman/victim test first received 
notoriety in Ellison v. Bmdy,42 a case decided by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 1991. The test gives greater weight to the 
victim's perspective in harassment cases. 
33 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1991). 
34 See id. at 877-78. 
35No. 92-1168, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7155, at *1 (Nov. 9, 1993). 
36No. 89-0557,1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20115, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 28, 1990). 
37 !d. 
38 [d. at *17. 
39 Harris, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7155, at *10. 
40 [d. at *10-11. 
41 [d. 
42 924 F.2d 872, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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C. The Reasonable Woman Test Under U. S. Law 
In Ellison, a female IRS agent received romantic love letters from 
one of her male co-workers.43 Although the IRS initially responded 
to her complaints by temporarily moving the co-worker to another 
job site, the IRS eventually reassigned the co-worker back to his 
original position.44 This prompted the plaintiff to sue the IRS for 
failing to take the appropriate steps to protect her from her co-
worker. 45 
Taking into account the general experiences of women,46 the 
court said that, "a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile 
environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a 
reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of employment. "47 The court also criticized 
Rabidue's requirement that a woman's psychological well-being be 
affected seriously.48 As the court stated, "surely, employees need not 
endure sexual harassment ... to the extent that they suffer anxiety 
and debilitation."49 Using this analysis, the court reasonably con-
cluded that the plaintiff legitimately feared her harasser and that 
her employer was liable for failing to protect her from working in a 
hostile work environment.5o 
The Ellison decision received a great deal of media attention and 
quickly gained influence in other jurisdictions. One district court in 
Florida even supported its use of the test with expert testimony and 
the results of sociological and psychological research that showed 
how harassment negatively affects women.51 The hypothetical rea-
sonable woman constructed by the Florida court supposedly was 
based on the results of objectively-based research as opposed to the 
biases of individual judges. 52 
43Id. at 874-75. 
HId. 
45Id. 
46Id. at 879. The court determined that women have the propensity to be traumatized by 
harassment because they are vulnerable to rape and therefore fear that harassment might 
lead to physical assault. Thus, it reasoned, women may tend to find certain behavior more 
offensive than men do. 
47 924 F.2d at 879. 
48Id. at 877-78. 
49Id. at 878. 
50Id. at 883. 
51 See id. at 879 n.10 (discussing 1989 U.S. Justice Department statistics, which showed that 
73% of every 100,000 women are reported rape victims); see also Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 
F. Supp. at 1503--Q4, 1506 (discussing testimony of a psychologist and a management consult-
ant who were experts on the effects of pornography on men and women, and how women 
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Lawyers for the plaintiff in Harris asked the Supreme Court to 
endorse the use of the reasonable woman test.53 The Court, however, 
failed to give a definitive response to their request.54 The Court 
simply stated that "conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough 
to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an 
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abra-
sive-is beyond Title VII's purview."55 The Court did not reject the 
reasonable woman test specifically, however. Consequently, lower 
courts still have room to maneuver with respect to its use.56 
Therefore, the courts in the United States will probably continue 
to be divided when it comes to determining whether hostile work 
harassment should be evaluated from the perspective of the reason-
able woman or the reasonable person. Absent the Supreme Court 
or the U.S. Congress specifically mandating that the courts use one 
test exclusively, the method of analysis used in harassment cases 
probably will depend on the particular circuit in which a case is 
heard, and the philosophical leanings of the individual judges who 
reside in those circuits. It is possible, however, that as the more 
liberal Clinton administration continues to appoint new judges, like 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, over the next three years, U.S. courts will start 
to lean more uniformly towards adopting a standard that gives the 
victim's perspective greater weight in harassment cases. 
D. The Probative Value of a Victim s Mode of Speech or Dress Under 
U.S. Law 
Under the U.S. Guidelines, a plaintiff also must show that she 
did not welcome the alleged harassment.57 In Meritor, the Supreme 
Court stated that the victim's sexually provocative speech or manner 
of dress could be used to make this determination. 58 It is interesting 
to note that the plaintiff in Mentor had sexually-charged conversa-
respond to sexual harassment. But see Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens J., dissenting) ("I 
find it surprising that the majority finds no need for evidence on any of these subjects."). Of 
course, some judges pay lip service to the reasonable woman test without making any real 
attempt to view harassment from the victims's perspective. When this Article discusses courts 
which use the reasonable woman test, it is not referring to these courts. 
52Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1503"'{)4, 1506. 
53 Harris, 1993 u.S. LEXIS 7155, at *19. 
54Id. at *16-18. 
55Id. at *7. 
56Id. at *16-18. 
57 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
58Id. at 73. 
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tions with her co-workers, but not with her supervisor-harasser. 59 
Some writers argue that, absent Vinson's having had such conversa-
tions directly with her supervisor, the relevancy of her conversations 
with others never should have been assumed by the Court.50 Criti-
cizing the presence of similar assumptions held by courts in the 
United Kingdom, Michael Rubenstein remarked that, "as in her life 
outside work, a woman at work should have a right to differentiate 
between the treatment she will accept from one man and another. 
That a woman will accept, or even welcome, a particular male col-
league putting his arm around her does not grant a license to every 
man in the organization to [do so]. "51 
Some courts also rely on the Supreme Court's pronouncements 
about "welcomeness" to determine whether or not a plaintiff is 
justified in claiming that she found the conduct in question to be 
offensive. For example, in Burns v. McGregor Electronics Industries, 52 
the plaintiffs harasser knew that she posed nude once in a maga-
zine.53 The court concluded that evidence about the plaintiffs nude 
appearance in the magazine might be relevant to determine 
whether or not she truly was offended by her harasser's lewd ges-
tures and personalized sexual comments.54 
The danger in allowing this type of evidence is that it perpetuates 
the age-old bias that the most chaste of women are entitled to be 
protected from rape, and by analogy, sexual harassment. Such an 
approach undermines the ability of women to be treated as equals 
in the workplace. The rules of evidence, more appropriately, should 
mandate that this type of evidence be shielded from review in the 
same manner that state rape shield laws block the review of similar 
types of evidence about rape victims. The state of California already 
has enacted such a rule in to law. 55 
59 See David Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent Develcpments In The Law Of Sexual Harassment: 
Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 239, 
261 (1987). 
60Id. ("Contemporaneous statements that sexual advances are welcome or unwelcome are 
obviously more objective expressions than are accounts of dreams or idle discussions about 
sex.") 
61 PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 20, at 12. 
62 955 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1992). 
63Id. 
64Id. at 565. 
65 See NANCY L. ABELL & BARBARA BERISH BROWN, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE, 
1993 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW UPDATE MANUAL, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: INVESTIGA-
TION, SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND DISCOVERY OF PRIOR SEXUAL HISTORY 25-26 (1993) [here-
inafter LAW UPDATE MANUAL) (quoting California Civil Code § 2017(d), which limits the 
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E. Remedies Under US. Law 
Traditionally, victims of sex discrimination were entitled only to 
"make-whole" relief under Title VII.66 The statute originally allowed 
courts to order companies to hire or reinstate successful harassment 
complainants, to award them back pay, or to grant them any other 
"appropriate" equitable relief.67 Most courts interpreted Title VII's 
remedial provisions conservatively, and only were willing to offer 
victims injunctive relief, job reinstatement, front pay, back pay, or 
attorneys' fees. 68 Traditional tort-like compensatory damages for 
pain and suffering, consequential damages for loss of future earn-
ings, and punitive damages were not awarded to plaintiffs.69 If a 
victim of sex discrimination wishes to recover for psychological in-
juries or punitive damages, she must sue her employer for such torts 
as intentional infliction of emotional distress or constructive dis-
charge. Both of these torts, however, are and were subject to a much 
more burdensome evaluative standard than typically is applied to 
the review of sexual harassment claims.70 
In response to calls for more appropriate relief in sex discrimina-
tion cases, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991 
(amendments).71 The amendments allow courts to award additional 
discovery of this type of evidence. The Code states: "any party seeking discovery concerning 
the plaintiffs sexual conduct with individuals other than the alleged perpetrator is required 
to establish specific facts showing good cause for that discovery ... and reasonably calculated 
to lead to a discovery of admissible evidence."); see also Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. 
App. 3d 557,253 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1988) (denying employer's request for discovery of evidence 
about the plaintiffs romantic involvements with other people at her place of employment). 
6642 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1990). 
67 [d. 
68 MACKA. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 435-36 (1988) (quoting Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 
424 U.S. 747, 777-79 (1976); Shah v. Mount Zion Hospital & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 
272 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
691d. 
70 SeeJackson v. Kimel; AT&T Technologies, Inc., No. 91-2396, 1993 U.S. App. LEXlS 10001, 
at *1, *18 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 1993) (plaintiff sued her employer for sexual harassment and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court stated that the test for an emotional 
distress claim was "whether the conduct complained of is sufficiently extreme and outrageous 
and [whether it was] intended to cause emotional distress."). For a discussion of the standard 
that is applied to constructive discharge claims, see Yates v. Avco, 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 
1987) ("proof of discrimination alone is not a sufficient predicate for a finding of constructive 
discharge; there must be other 'aggravating factors.' We have also required some inquiry into 
the employer's intent. ... ") (quoting Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 996 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); Cf Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (the test 
for sexual harassment is whether the conduct complained of is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 
'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.'" (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)). 
7142 U.S.C. § 1981a et seq. (1993). 
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compensatory damages "for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, 
suffering, inconvenience . . . and other nonpecuniary losses" to 
victims of intentional discrimination.72 The amendments also allow 
courts to award punitive damages to these victims.73 Damage awards, 
however, are subject to statutory limits, which range from $50,000 
for employers with fifteen to one hundred employees to $300,000 
for employers with five hundred employees.74 The amount of back 
pay, and other traditional types of Title VII make-whole relief, are 
not limited by the new statutory caps.75 
Plaintiffs in race and national origin discrimination cases also are 
entitled to sue in the alternative for unlimited compensatory and 
punitive damages under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.76 These plaintiffs can recover for damages only once, under 
either Section 1981 or Title VII.77 Sex discrimination plaintiffs, how-
ever, are not entitled to sue for damages under Section 1981. Recent 
proposals from Senator Edward Kennedy'S office have been made 
to revise the 1991 amendments to lift the current limits on damage 
awards, allowing sex discrimination plaintiffs the same type of relief 
that race and national origin plaintiffs now are entitled to under 
Section 198J.78 
Although some fear that the 1991 amendments will cause a host 
of unsubstantiated claims to be filed by employees seeking high 
monetary awards, statistics on rulings in race discrimination lawsuits 
over the last ten years indicate that such fears are without merit. 
Even though the plaintiffs in these cases are entitled to an unlimited 
amount of compensatory and punitive damages under Section 1981, 
fewer than one percent of the lawsuits resulted in damage awards 
higher than $100,000.79 Furthermore, given the high number of new 
harassment claims that recently have been filed with the USEEOC,80 
72/d. §§ I98Ia-(b) (2), (b) (3). 
73Id. § I98Ia-(b) (1). 
74Id. § I98Ia-b(3). 
75Id. 
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1990). 
77Id. § I98Ia-(a) (1) (1993). 
78 See A Bill To Amend Section 1977A of the Revised Statutes to Equalize Remedies Available To 
All Victims Of Intentional Employment Discrimination, And For Other Purposes, S. 17, I03d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Kennedy BillJ. 
79 See Nicole R. Lipper, Sexual Harassment In The Workplace: A Comparative Study Of Great 
Britain And The United States, 13 COMPo LAB. L. J. 293, 330 (1992) (citing 137 Congo Rec. 
(Daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Atkins». 
80 In the 15 months following the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court nomination hearings, 
there was a 69% increase in the number of sexual harassment claims filed with the USEEOC. 
LAw UPDATE MANUAL, supra note 65, § 3, at 1. 
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prior forms of remedial relief obviously did not motivate recalcitrant 
employers adequately, or else fewer claimants would now be filing 
harassment claims with the USEEOC. Hopefully, the 1991 amend-
ments will cause employers to take a more proactive approach to the 
problem of workplace sexual harassment. 
F. Employer Liability Under U.S. Law 
1. Traditional Agency Law Theory 
Under the agency law doctrine of respondeat superior, employers 
usually are held liable for torts committed by employees within the 
scope of their employment. U.S. courts generally believe that em-
ployers should be liable vicariously for tortious acts committed by 
their employees if at least two of the following factors are present: 
(1) the acts were the kind of acts that the employee was hired to 
perform or which can be regarded as minor deviations in the em-
ployee's job responsibilities, and (2) the acts were partly motivated 
by the employee'S desire to serve the employer.81 For example, one 
state court held that an employees's smoking was a minor deviation 
from his work-related duties, which required him to travel away on 
business and fill out company expense reimbursement forms. The 
court ruled that the company vicariously was liable for a fire caused 
by the employee's lit cigarette. At the time, the employee was smok-
ing while filling out expense forms that ultimately enabled the 
employer to deduct travel expenses on his tax returns.82 
Most courts in the United States believe that employers always 
should be liable for quid pro quo harassment because this type of 
harassment directly relates to a supervisor's ability to give or take 
away job benefits. As such, quid pro quo harassment falls within 
the scope of responsibilities that employers delegate to supervisors. 
Courts are reluctant, however, to view supervisor hostile environ-
ment harassment in the same manner. Many judges find that em-
ployers should not be liable for supervisor hostile environment 
harassment because there is no overt connection between this type 
of harassment and the ability of a supervisor to take away or give job 
benefits. Thus, while a fire caused by a supervisor's smoking might 
lead to a company's respondeat superior liability, the supervisor's 
81 MICHAEL B. METZGER, JANE P. MALLOR, ET AL, BUSINESS LAw AND THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 806-07 (1991). 
82 [d. at 806 (discussing Edgewater Motels, Inc. v. Gatzke, 277 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 
1979) ). 
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harassment of a female employee may not lead necessarily to the 
same result. Since hostile environment harassment is probably just 
as, if not more, pervasive in the workplace today than smoking is, 
the distinction seems illogical. One writer accused judges who hold 
this view of attempting to treat sexual harassment as a private per-
sonal matter best left outside the reach of the law.83 
2. The Importance of Establishing Grievance Procedures and 
Taking Appropriate Remedial Actions Against Harassers 
Under U.S. Law 
In the Meritor case, the USEEOC suggested that employers should 
be held strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment.84 It also suggested 
that employers should be liable only for supervisor or co-worker 
hostile environment harassment, if they fail to establish grievance 
procedures specifically designed to deal with complaints about har-
assment.85 The USEEOC argued that if such procedures are in place 
and harassed employees fail to rely on them, then employers should 
be shielded completely from liability.86 The USEEOC maintained 
that companies should be protected in this manner unless it can be 
shown that they knew about the harassment before any outside 
claims were filed. 87 
The Supreme Court focused on the relationship between em-
ployer liability and four issues raised by the USEEOC recommenda-
tions. Those four issues are: (1) whether or not employers should 
be liable for supervisor harassment; (2) whether or not the existence 
of company grievance procedures designed to deal with sexual har-
assment should shield companies from liability; (3) whether the 
plaintiffs use (or failure to use) those procedures to complain about 
harassment should shield companies from liability; and (4) whether 
a company's lack of knowledge about the harassment should protect 
it from liability.88 
The Court first stated that employers are not liable automatically 
for supervisor harassment. It also stated that company grievance 
procedures do not protect employers automatically from liability 
under Title VII, although the existence of such procedures could 
83 See Lipper, supra note 79, at 334. 
84 477 U.S. at 70-71. 
85Id. at 71. 
86Id. 
87 Id.; see also the U.S. Guidelines, 29 CFR § 1604.11 (c)-(d). 
88 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-69. 
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protect companies from liability if harassed employees failed to use 
those procedures.89 The Court further explained that employers 
were not shielded automatically from liability simply because they 
lacked notice about the harassment.9o Finally, the Court suggested 
that lower courts rely on traditional agency law principles to make 
this determination.91 The Court discussed these four factors in an 
open-ended manner. Consequently, the Court ultimately failed to 
issue a definitive rule about employer liability. In their attempts to 
follow the Supreme Court's guidance in Mentor, lower courts have 
approached the issue of employer liability somewhat conservatively. 
Many courts choose to follow the USEEOC's recommendations and 
hold employers strictly liable for supervisor quid pro quo harass-
ment, but not for supervisor or co-worker hostile environment har-
assment. Typically, courts only find employers liable for hostile en-
vironment harassment when employers fail to take remedial actions 
that are designed to stop harassment once they have been put on 
notice that the harassment is taking place.92 
For example, in Kaufmann v. Allied Signal, Inc.,93 the court of 
appeals evaluated the alleged supervisor-harasser's conduct as hos-
tile environment harassment.94 The court found the combined pres-
ence of a company grievance procedure, and the fact that the 
company fired the supervisor-harasser once it learned of the harass-
ment sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs claims.95 The court made this 
determination despite the fact that the company grievance proce-
dure was not designed to address sexual harassment specifically.96 
The court in Kaufmann also stated that the employer would have 
been strictly liable had the supervisor's conduct constituted quid pro 
quo harassment.97 Judging from his concurring opinion in the Men-
tor case, the late Justice Thurgood Marshall would not have made 
89Id. at 72-73. 
90Id. 
91Id. at 71. 
92 Kaufmann v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992). 
93Id. 
94Id. at 182. 
95 Id.; see Hall V. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d lOlO, lO15-16 (8th Cir. 1988) (because 
company foreman was aware that male workers were touching female colleagues inappropri-
ately-touching one woman's breasts and making obscene comments-nicknaming one 
woman "herpes," the company had enough notice to warrant its taking corrective measures 
to stop the harassment). 
96 Kaufinann, 970 F.2d at 184-85. 
97 !d. at 185...{l6 (quoting Highlander V. E.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 
(6th Cir. 1986)). 
1994] SEXUAL HARASSMENT 249 
the same distinction between supervisor quid pro quo and hostile 
environment harassment that the court made in the Kaufmann case. 
Marshall stated, "it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the 
employer that enables him to commit the wrong in the first place."98 
He believed that courts should treat sexual harassment victims in 
the same manner that courts treat victims of racial harassment (i.e., 
that employers should be held strictly liable for all wrongful discrimi-
natory acts committed by supervisors). Marshall thus would have 
found the employer in Kaufmann strictly liable, despite the fact it 
later fired the supervisor. 
In Intlekofer v. Turnage,99 a case decided by the same court of 
appeals that decided the Ellison case, the court addressed the issue 
of employer liability for co-worker harassment. 100 The court did not 
propose that a strict liability test be used in these cases.IOI It instead 
focused on the extent to which companies took appropriate reme-
dial measures to stop harassment.102 If such measures are commen-
surate with the level of severity of the conduct under review, the 
court implied that the employers should be shielded from liability 
for co-worker harassment,I03 
In Intlekofer, the plaintiff repeatedly complained to her employer 
that she was being subjected to unwanted touching and pressure to 
en ter into a romantic relationship with a co-worker. 104 During several 
counseling sessions, the company verbally warned the harasser to 
stop. The company never, however, took any formal disciplinary 
measures against the co-worker.105 
Criticizing the company for failing to take more appropriate re-
medial actions against the co-worker, the court explained: 
at the first sign of sexual harassment, an oral warning in 
the context of a counseling session may be an appropriate 
disciplinary measure if . . . the harassing conduct is not 
extremely serious . . . [but a counseling session] is suf-
ficien t only as a first resort. If the harassment con tinues, 
limiting discipline to further counseling is inappropriate. 
98 477 U.S. at 76-77 (Marshall,]., concurring). 
99No. 90-16793,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19400, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at *12-15. 
102 Id. at *12-13. 
103Id. at *19-21. 
104 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19400, at *3-5. 
105Id. at *3-4. 
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Instead, the employer must impose more severe measures 
in order to ensure that the behavior terminates. 106 
In this case, the court implied that the company first should have 
issued a formal reprimand and then fired the co-worker once he 
continued to harass the plaintiff even after receiving an informal 
warning to stop.107 
The Court in Kaufmann emphasizes to a greater degree than in 
Intlekofer that companies should take affirmative steps designed to 
stop harassment. lOB Furthermore, the existence of a company griev-
ance procedure, on its own, is not enough to protect companies 
from liability. Indeed, poorly designed procedures, which fail to 
provide victims with an adequate means of reporting harassment,l09 
or fail to ensure that employee complaints are investigated in a fair 
and thorough manner,110 generally should not protect companies 
from liability. 
III. U.K STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEFINITIONS OF 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
The U.K Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 (SDA) does not refer 
specifically to sexual harassment. The SDA provides that it is unlaw-
ful for an employer to treat women less favorably than men with 
respect to their employment conditions. The SDA states that it is 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a woman "(a) in 
the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion, trans-
fer or training, or to any other benefits ... or (b) by dismissing her, 
or subjecting her to any other detriment. "lll 
The SDA also created the Equal Opportunities Commission 
(UKEOC) , and charged it with the responsibility for promoting 
gender equality and encouraging the elimination of discrimination 
106 [d. at *20. 
107 [d. at *22-23. 
108 See also Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 1989). 
109 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73 (Supreme Court criticizing the inadequacy of the Bank's 
grievance procedure, which required the plaintiff to report her harassment to the very person 
that was harassing her-her supervisor. Had this not been the case, the Court implied that 
the Bank might have had a stronger case.). 
llO See Waltman, 875 F.2d at 479-80 (criticizing company manager for not formally warning 
her alleged harasser and for transferring the plaintiff to another shift after she complained 
about being harassed). 
l!l Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, Ch. 65, § 6(2) (a)-(b) (1975) (Eng.) [hereinafter SDAJ. 
Theoretically, the SDA also entitles men to the same equal treatment Most V.K. sexual 
harassment claims, however, are brought by women. 
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by issuing guidelines to eliminate sex discrimination in employ-
ment. ll2 Unlike the USEEOC, which is responsible for race, relig-
ious, national origin, and sex discrimination in employment, the 
UKEOC is only responsible for handling sex discrimination prob-
lems. ll3 U.K. courts, like their U.S. counterparts, also sometimes rely 
on the U.K. Guidelines when it comes to rendering decisions in 
harassment cases, notwithstanding the fact that the U.K. Guidelines 
do not carry the force of lawY4 
It took the UKEOC ten years after the enactment of the SDA to 
issue the U.K. Guidelines. ll5 The U.K. Guidelines state that: 
it is unlawful: to discriminate directly or indirectly on 
grounds of sex ... [and] it is therefore recommended that 
... (e) all reasonably practical steps should be taken to 
ensure that a standard of conduct ... is observed which 
prevents members of either sex from being intimidated, 
harassed or otherwise subjected to unfavorable treatment on the 
ground of their sex. 1l6 
The U.K. Guidelines are similar to the U.S. Guidelines in many 
respects. The terms, "intimidated," "harassed," or "other unfavor-
able treatment" in the U.K. Guidelines are similar to the words, 
"hostile," "intimidating," and "offensive" in the U.S. Guidelines. 
References to harassment or intimidation "on the ground of sex" in 
the U.K. Guidelines are similar to the phrase, "unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature" in the U.S. Guidelines. As mentioned, 
the U.K. Guidelines condemn any type of harassment, as long as it 
intimates or subjects someone to unequal treatment because of their 
sex. Although they blur the distinction between quid pro quo and 
hostile environment harassment, their practical effect is to prohibit 
both types of harassment. ll7 
112/d. §§ 53(1)(b), 56A(I); see also ALICE M. LEONARD, JUDGING INEQUALITY, THE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL SYSTEM IN SEX DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL PAY 
CASES 1 (1987) [hereinafter JUDGING INEQUALITY]. 
113 JUDGING INEQUALITY, supra note 112, at 1 n.l. 
114 See id. at 5. 
115 Equal Opportunities Commission, Code Of Practice For The Elimination Of Discrimi-
nation On The Grounds Of Sex And Marriage And The Promotion Of Equality Of Opportu-
nity In Employment (Apr. 30, 1985) [hereinafter U.K. Guidelines]. 
116Id. § 32(e) (emphasis added). 
117The U.K.'s Employment Department also has issued guidelines for employers on sexual 
harassment. The guidelines describe harassment in more detail than the U.K. Guidelines. For 
example, the Employment Department guidelines state that examples of unacceptable con-
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IV. V.K. CASE LAw DEFINITIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. Quid Pro Quo vs. Hostile Environment-A Variation on the U.S. 
Theme 
Similar to the V.K. Guidelines, V.K. case law does not make the 
same distinction between quid pro quo harassment and hostile en-
vironment harassment as found in V.S. case law. V.K. courts instead 
focus on the extent to which harassment causes a victim to suffer a 
"detriment" under section 6 of the SDA. By taking this approach, 
V.K. courts prohibit both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
harassment, as well as conduct which does not fit quite so neatly into 
either of these two categories. 
For example, in Strachclyde Regional Council v. Porcelli,118 the first 
appellate level case to condemn sexual harassment, the plaintiffleft 
her job because she was harassed by co-workers. The court found 
that the plaintiff's constructive dismissal ("unfair dismissal" in the 
V.K.) constituted enough of a detriment to justifY the plaintiff's 
claims under the SDA for sexual harassment and sex discrimination. 
In this case, which was decided by the Scottish Court of Session, 119 
a female lab technician was the object of unwanted sexually sugges-
tive comments, leering, inappropriate invasions of personal space, 
and a general campaign conducted by two co-workers to thwart her 
ability to do her job. I20 The plaintiff ultimately obtained a transfer 
duct include "suggestions that sexual favors may further someone's career ... [or] lewd, 
suggestive or overfamiliar behavior. ... " Emplayment Department, Sexual Harassment In The 
Workplace-A Guide For Emplayers (Feb. 1992). The Employment Department Guidelines are 
intended to serve as guidelines for companies only, however, and do not carry the force of 
law. While this is also true for the U.K. Guidelines, the SDA requires that courts rely on the 
U.K. Guidelines. No such requirement exists with respect to the Employment Department 
Guidelines. 
118 [1986] I.R.L.R. 134. 
119The court system in the United Kingdom is set up differently from the court system in 
the United States. Industrial tribunals, which were specifically set up to hear claims under the 
SDA and other employment-related statutes, are the first to review sex discrimination claims. 
Two of the three judges on an industrial tribunal panel do not have to be lawyers, and there 
is no requirement that rules of evidence be used during tribunal proceedings. The Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunals review industrial tribunal decisions, and the Court of Appeal reviews 
Employment Appeal Tribunal decisions. Finally, the House of Lords, the equivalent of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, reviews the Court of Appeal decisions. In Scotland, the Court of Session 
first reviews employment tribunal decisions. The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, 
respectively, review the Court of Session decisions. Interview with Alice Leonard, General 
Counsel, UKEOC (Feb. 3, 1993); see also RJ. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 220 
(London: Butterworths 1980). 
120Strachclyde Regional Council v. Porcelli, [1986] I.R.L.R. 135-36 (for example, the plain-
tiff testified that on one occasion a co-worker told her that she looked like she could be a 
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to avoid further harassment. 121 Because co-workers perpetrated the 
conduct in Porcelli, U.S. law defines it as hostile environment harass-
ment. Therefore, U.S. courts would try to determine whether or not 
the conduct was unreasonable or offensive, or whether it subjected 
the plaintiff to a hostile and abusive work environment. 
The Court of Session, however, did not attempt to categorize the 
co-worker conduct in this manner.122 Rather, the Court focused on 
whether or not the plaintiff was treated less favorably than a man 
would have been in a similar situation.123 The Court reasoned that 
if the treatment was less favorable, then the plaintiff suffered a legal 
detriment within the meaning of the SDA.124 Rejecting the em-
ployer's contentions that the plaintiff was treated no differendy than 
a disliked man in the same situation, the Court stated that "the 
campaign was plainly adopted against the [plaintiff] because she was 
a woman."125 The Court thus concluded that the plaintiff had been 
subjected to 'sexual harassment,' a particularly degrading and un-
acceptable form of treatment. 126 
Since the plaintiff sought a transfer to avoid further harassment, 
the Porcelli decision implies that (1) a job transfer or resignation 
initiated by a plaintiff could be considered a tangible job loss and 
(2) that similar tangible job losses would have to occur before 
harassment victims could win in court in the future. 127 In De Souza 
v. Automobile Association,128 a racial harassment case decided just 
before the Court of Session reviewed Porcelli, the Court of Appeal 
emphasized that harassment victims need not suffer such losses to 
prevail in court.129 The court also endorsed the use of the reasonable 
person test to evaluate racial harassment, and by implication, sexual 
harassmen t claims.130 
nude model in a magazine. On another occasion, he removed personal possessions from her 
desk and refused to return them while shouting obscenities at her). 
121 [d. at 135. 
122 See id. at 134. 
123 [d. at 134-37. 
124 [d. at 136. 
125 Porcelli, [1986] I.R.L.R. at 137. 
126 [d. 
127In fact, the opinion of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which was affirmed by the 
Court of Session decision in P(ffcelli, specifically stated that the plaintiff suffered a detriment 
because "she felt obliged to seek transfer ... to another school. ... [Thus] the campaign of 
harassment, ... with the objective of making the appellant apply for a transfer, had suc-
ceeded." Porcelli, [1986] I.R.L.R. 167, 169. 
128 [1986]I.R.L.R. 514. 
129 [d. 
130 See id. 
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B. The Reasonable Person Test In u.K. Sexual Harassment Law 
In Desouza, a non-white secretary overheard her supervisor make 
a racially derogatory comment about her.131 Unlike the plaintiff in 
Porcelli, the secretary did not leave her job because of what she 
heard. 132 The Court of Appeal stated that racial harassment victims 
should not be barred from recovering in court just because they do 
not leave their jobs or obtain transfers to avoid further harass-
ment. 133 
The Court of Appeal also stated that the claims needed to be 
evaluated on the basis of whether or not a "putative reasonable 
employee could justifiably complain about his or her working condi-
tions"134 under similar circumstances. The court thus seemed to 
endorse the use of a standard similar to the reasonable person test. 
This is the same test used by some U.S. courts to make it more 
difficult for hostile environment harassment victims to succeed in 
court. 
In a seemingly contradictory statement, however, the court stated 
that the real test should be whether or not the secretary could show 
that both she "and the reasonable coloured secretary in like situations 
would or might [have been] ... disadvantaged. "135 Such a test, if 
applied, would have been a ground-breaking new approach in U.K. 
discrimination law-an approach which seriously took into account 
the victim's perspective in discrimination cases. A closer reading of 
the decision, however, reveals that the court never intended such a 
result. 
The court in Desouza concluded that a reasonable colored secre-
tary would not have been disadvantaged by what the plaintiff over-
heard. 136 In contrast to U.S. proponents of the reasonable woman 
test, the court did not rely on expert testimony or statistical research 
to determine how people of color would generally react to the type 
of comments overheard by the plaintiff. The court's judges instead 
relied on their own personal beliefs to assess the plaintiff's claims. 
Many U.S. courts who use the reasonable person test have been 
criticized for using the same type of subjective analysis to adjudicate 
131 [d. at 517. 
132 [d. 
133 De Souza v. Automobile Assoc., [l9S6]I.R.L.R. at 524. 
134 [d. (emphasis added). 
135 [d. 
136 [d. at 524-25. 
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sexual harassment claims. Thus, the Desouza court paid lip service 
to the reasonable victim test without ever actually applying it. 
Some may argue that it is unfair to expect the Desouza court to 
construct a standard of reasonableness based on more than the 
personal experiences and preconceptions of its individual judges. 
First, the type of expert testimony and statistical evidence often used 
in U.S. litigation to prove race or sex discrimination has never been 
given as much weight in the United Kingdom. 137 Furthermore, not 
even the U.S. Supreme Court, which decided the Meritorcase a year 
after Desouza was decided, referred to the type of research on har-
assment that courts who use the reasonable woman test rely on 
today. These arguments, however, should be viewed with some skep-
ticism. As long as courts continue to substitute their own subjective 
analysis for available objectively-based research, the risk will remain 
that harassment victims will not be treated fairly in court. 
A recent example of a U.K. case that uses the reasonable person 
test in a way that unfairly disadvantages sexual harassment victims is 
the tribunal case, Stewart v. Cleveland Guest Engineering Ltd. 138 In 
Stewart, the plain tiff claimed that she was illegally discriminated 
against because she worked in a job setting that displayed pornog-
raphy.139 The pornography consisted of several calendars depicting 
nude females and one calendar poster that depicted a nude male. 140 
Even though the court acknowledged that the employer was a male-
dominated company with a history of treating women as sex objects, 
the court ruled that the plaintiff was not subjected to unequal 
treatment on the grounds of sex because men and women would be 
offended similarly by the pornography in question. 141 
The employment tribunal made no objective effort to determine 
whether or not pornography has a uniquely traumatic effect on 
women. 142 In the 1991 U.S. case, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 143 
the court approached this same issue quite differently.144 In Jackson-
ville Shipyards, the court ruled that "the sexualization of the work-
place imposes burdens on women that are not borne by men" 
137 See Michael Rubenstein, Do We Need Independent Experts for Discrimination Cases? 48 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES REV. (May/June 1986). 
138 Indus. Trib. (Case No. 17090) 1,13 (1992). 
139Id. 
140 Id. 
141Id. 
142 See id. 
143 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
144 Id. 
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because it tends to make men view their female co-workers as sex 
objects.145 When women are viewed in this manner, the court rea-
soned, they are in effect treated differently because of their sex.146 
The judge in Jacksonville Shipyards based his analysis on the testi-
mony of an expert who cited psychological studies that demon-
strated how pornography negatively effects women.147 In another 
U.S. case, which involved pornography that depicted both men and 
women, the court stated that while most pornography includes 
"both male and female 'references,' ... [such references are] highly 
offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with her fellow employees 
with professional dignity and without the barrier of sexual differen-
tiation. "148 
Traditionally, it has been easier for victims of quid pro quo har-
assment to prevail in U.S. courts than it has for victims of hostile 
environment harassment. This is because U.S. courts tend to apply 
the more burdensome reasonable person test to evaluate hostile 
environment harassment claims. When read together, the Porcelli 
and De Souza decisions appear to allow U.K. courts to use the 
reasonable person test to evaluate all harassment claims on the same 
basis that hostile environment claims are evaluated in the United 
States.149 Consequently, sex harassment claimants presumably fair 
poorly in the United Kingdom. While this initially may have been 
the case, studies suggest that the prospects for claimants in the 
United Kingdom have improved over the last few years. In her 
extensive review of the impact of the industrial tribunal system on 
sex discrimination cases decided before Porcelli, Alice Leonard, now 
Deputy General Counsel to the UKEOC, found the tribunal system 
to be heavily biased in favor of employers. 15o Leonard based her 
findings on a variety of factors, including the fact that non-lawyer 
judges who lacked experience in sex discrimination law often de-
cided tribunal hearings, the claimants chose to represent themselves 
at the hearings, and the judges applied the evidentiary rules in a lax 
manner. 15l In a later study that focused exclusively on post-Porcelli 
sexual harassment cases, Leonard found that the number of success-
145Id. at 1505. 
146Id. 
147Id. 
148 Waltman, 875 F.2d at 477 (quoting Bennett v. Cormon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 
(5th Cir. 1988)). 
149 See Porcelli, [1986] LR.L.R. 134; DeSouza [1986] LR.L.R. 514. 
150JUDGING INEQUALITY, supra note 112, at 132, 144. 
151Id. 
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ful harassment claims increased significantly between 1986 and 
1990.152 She attributed the increased success rate to several factors, 
including the fact that a high number of claimants hired qualified 
attorneys to represent themselves before the tribunals. 153 Since mon-
etary awards in discrimination cases are traditionally much lower in 
the United Kingdom than in the United States, the increased success 
rate discussed by Leonard should be viewed with some caution. 
C. The Probative Value of a Victim's Speech or Dress Under UK Law 
Another factor which should be considered in U.K. case law on 
sexual harassment, is whether or not the courts are willing to admit 
evidence about a victim's mode of speech or dress as a challenge to 
her sexual harassment claim. Unlike Meritor, neither Porcelli nor 
Desouza discuss the extent to which a woman's mode of speech or 
dress is relevant to an inquiry about whether she welcomed her 
harassment.154 Several U.K. employment appeal tribunals, however, 
considered whether such evidence should be admitted to determine 
if a harassment victim suffered enough psychological harm ("injury 
to feelings" in the U.K.) to be compensated for her injuries. For 
example, citing evidence that the plaintiff discussed her attitudes 
about sex with co-workers, one appeal tribunal stated that "in order 
to challenge the alleged detriment and hurt to feelings ... it is 
pertinent to enquire ... whether the complainant ... is unlikely to 
be very upset by the degree of familiarity with a sexual connota-
tion."155 Applying similar reasoning to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Meritor, the court rejected the view that such evidence should be 
admitted only if similar discussions had taken place between the 
plaintiff and her alleged supervisor-harasser. 156 
Another employment appeal tribunal took a different position on 
this issue. In Wileman v. Minilec Engineering Ltd.,157 the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff still had the capacity to suffer psychological 
harm as a result of being harassed, even though she previously had 
appeared as a scantily-dressed model in a national magazine.15s The 
court stated that "quite clearly, the picture itself cannot affect, in any 
152 See Alice Leonard, Remedies for Sexual Harassment, 141 NEW L.J. 1514-16 (Nov. 8,1991). 
153 [d. at 1514. 
154 See Porcelli, [1986] I.R.L.R. 134; DeSouza [1986] I.R.L.R. 514. 
155 Snowball v. Gardner Merchant Ltd, [1987] I.R.L.R. 397, 400. 
156 [d. at 399-401. 
157 [1986] I.R.L.R. 144. 
158 [d. 
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way, the question of physical harassment. Secondly, its probative 
value in relation to comments made by a director seem to us to be 
almost minimal."159 Since U.K. courts appear to be divided on this 
issue, the extent to which evidence about a plaintiff's speech or dress 
will be considered per se admissible will depend on the particular 
court where a case is heard, unless the House of Lords or the Court 
of Appeal mandate that a more uniform approach be adopted. In 
the event of such a mandate, information about the plaintiff's non-
contemporaneous sexually-charged statements or activities should 
be shielded from review. 
D. Remedies Under UK Law 
The SDA allows courts in the United Kingdom to award damages 
and to grant injunctive relief to harassment victims.16o Unlike U.S. 
statutory law, however, it does not appear to allow U.K. courts to 
order the type of wide-reaching relief that also can benefit other 
employees in the same job setting. 161 In contrast to their U.S. coun-
terparts, courts in the United Kingdom always have been able to 
award a broad range of compensatory damages in sex discrimination 
cases, including damages for pecuniary losses and for injury to 
feelings. 162 The damages, however, also are subject to an overall 
statutory limit, which in 1993 was set at 11,000 pounds. 163 The statu-
tory limit does not relate to the size of the employer.164 Based on a 
1993 exchange rate, the 10,000 pound limit amounts to approxi-
mately $15,000.165 While this figure is somewhat similar to the 
$50,000 cap on damages for small businesses, it is significantly lower 
than the $300,000 amount that U.S. courts can assess against larger 
U.S. companies for pain and suffering and/or punitive damages. In 
addition, while back pay and other compensatory damages are in-
cluded in the U.K. cap, back pay is not included in the U.S. cap. 
Initially, U.K. courts granted monetary awards that fell well below 
statutory limits. For example, in a 1987 case, a court awarded a 
159Id. 
160SDA, supra note Ill, § 65(1) (a)-(c). 
161Id. § 65(1) (c) (this subsection states that tribunals can recommend that employers take 
actions that are designed to reduce the adverse effects of discrimination on plaintifft). 
162Id. §§ 65(1) (b), 66(4). 
163 Brian Napier, Community Law and Awards for Discrimination, 143 NEW L.J. 1184 (Aug. 
13, 1993). 
164Id. 
165This is based on a exchange rate of $1.50 to 1 British pound sterling. Foreign Currency 
Rates, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1993, at B31. 
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plaintiff 200 pounds for injury to her feelings. The employer dis-
missed the plaintiff because she objected to being harassed. In a 
1988 case, Cooper v. Tibbett and Britten, another plaintiff was awarded 
only 400 pounds for injury to feelings, even though she successfully 
proved that her harasser subjected her to demands for sex. 166 Recent 
studies suggest, however, that the courts are beginning to award 
higher damage amounts for injury to feelings. 167 
Despite these recent instances of unusually larger monetary 
awards, the amount of compensation available to harassment victims 
is drastically lower than what is available for victims in the United 
States. For example, in the United States, a harassment victim can 
recover for back pay and up to $300,000 for punitive damages and 
pain and suffering, depending on the size of the employer. In the 
United Kingdom, that same plaintiff can recover only the equivalent 
of $15,000 for both back pay and injury to feelings, notwithstanding 
the size of the employer. In this sense, the plight of women in the 
United Kingdom is similar to the plight of women in the United 
States before the U.S. Congress passed the 1991 amendments to the 
Civil Rights Act. 
Harassment victims can rely on alternative legal theories in order 
to seek more appropriate relief in the United Kingdom. For in-
stance, if a plaintiff leaves her job to avoid continued harassment, 
she could argue that she was dismissed unfairly under Section 55 of 
the Employment Protection Consolidation Act of 1978.168 A plaintiff 
also could argue that her employer breached an implied contract of 
mutual trust and support.169 Plaintiffs are not limited by the amount 
of damages that they can recover in these types of cases.l70 It usually 
takes more time and more money, however, to litigate these cases 
than it does to litigate cases under the SDA.l7l 
166Leonard, supra note 152, at 1515. 
167Id. at 1514-15. Leonard cites several post-1989 cases in which harassment victims were 
awarded between 1000 and 3000 pounds for injury to feelings. In two of those cases, the 
plaintiffs were able to show that they had become ill and/or required counseling because of 
the harassment. Id. 
168 16 HALBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (Fourth Ed.) 'l[ 381. The act protects employees from 
being unfairly dismissed if they have worked for their employers for at least two years. 
169 See id. 
170 See Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v. Darby, [1991]1.R.L.R. 3-6. The employment tribunal 
upheld a lower court finding that the plaintiff was discriminated against because she had to 
quit her job after she was assaulted and touched in a sexual manner by her supervisor and a 
company manager. The plaintiff was awarded 2,900 pounds in compensatory damages for 
being unfairly dismissed and 150 pounds for being sexually harassed. Id. 
171 PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 20, at 18. 
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E. Employer Liability Under U.K Law 
Unlike U.S. case law, U.K. law does not distinguish between quid 
pro quo and hostile environment harassment to assess employer 
liability. The SDA provides that employers should be held strictly 
liable for any discriminatory acts "done by a person in the course of 
his employment."I72 Employers are protected from liability, however, 
if they can show that they "took such steps as were reasonably 
practicable to prevent the employee from [committing the harassing 
conduct] ."173 The SDA also states that lack of knowledge about 
harassment does not shield employers from liability.174 
Because no distinction is made between quid pro quo and hostile 
environment harassment, this strict liability test applies to all forms 
of harassment. It can not be assumed, however, that employers are 
held to a higher standard of liability in the United Kingdom than 
in the United States. In the United States, courts generally rule that 
an employer will not be liable for hostile environment harassment 
if it can show that appropriate corrective actions were taken once it 
became aware that harassment occurred. Such action will not usually 
release a company from liability for quid pro quo harassment. Such 
a showing, however, will release U.K. employers from liability for the 
equivalent of both quid pro quo and hostile environment harass-
ment. 
F. The Importance of Establishing Grievance Procedures and Taking 
Appropriate Remedial Actions Against Harassers Under U.K Law 
Like courts in the United States, U.K. courts tend to focus on the 
type of corrective actions that companies need to take to protect 
themselves from liability. This focus is consistent with the SDA which 
states that companies should take reasonable steps that are designed 
to prevent harassment. There is some dispute, however, as to 
whether employers should adopt training programs and grievance 
procedures that address the problem in advance, or whether pun-
ishment after the harassment will suffice. 
In a 1987 employment appeal tribunal case, Balgobin and Francis 
v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets,175 the court took the latter 
172 SDA, supra note llI, § 41 (l). It also is possible for a plaintiff to bring a tort action against 
her harasser, or for the government to bring criminal actions against him for assault as well. 
173Id. § 41(3). 
174Id. 
175 [1987] LR.L.R. 401. 
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approach. 176 In Balgobin, a co-worker harassed two female employ-
ees.177 The company had a discrimination policy, but it was not 
communicated effectively to its employees. 178 The company also did 
not have a grievance procedure in place that would enable employ-
ees to air their complaints.179 
The court held that the employer still could protect itself from 
liability by using the excuse that it did not know that the women 
were being harassed. 180 The court stated, "it is very difficult to see 
what steps in practical terms the employers could reasonably have 
taken to prevent that which occurred from occurring. "181 Although 
it seems obvious that a grievance procedure and clearly communi-
cated company policy condemning harassment might have pre-
vented the harassment, the court ignored this possibility. 
In Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v. Darby,182 a 1990 case decided by 
another employment appeal tribunal, the court instead focused on 
the importance of having a fair and effective grievance procedure 
in place before harassment occurs.183 In Bracebridge, a supervisor and 
a company manager assaulted and sexually touched the plaintiff. 184 
The company grievance procedure, however, required her first to 
lodge a complaint with the very people who harassed her. ISS When 
the plaintiff sidestepped her harassers and complained to the next 
company manager up the hierarchal chain of command, her com-
plaints were not taken seriously.186 Since the only other person that 
the plaintiff could have complained to-the company president-
was out of town, the plaintiff decided to quit her job in order to 
avoid continued harassment. 187 
Responding to the argument that the plaintiff should have waited 
and complained to the company president instead of quitting, the 
court stated, "in our judgement there was no failure even if she was 
under a duty, which we doubt, to go through the grievance procedure 
176 See id. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
179 [d. 
180 Balgobin and Francis v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets, [1987] I.R.L.R. at 401. 
181 [d. at 401-03. 
182 [1990] I.R.L.R. 3. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. 
185 [d. 
186 [d. 
187 Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v. Darby, [1991] I.R.L.R. at 3-6. 
262 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVII, No.2 
in light of what happened in stage one."188 The court thus implied 
that while the existence of a company grievance procedure is impor-
tant, such a procedure has no value if (l) it does not provide 
complainants with a fair and impartial avenue of redress and (2) it 
is not implemented in a manner that is designed to stop harassment 
once it occurs. 
Evidently, u.K. case law also is mixed on the issue of employer 
liability. As a practical and ethical matter, companies probably 
should follow the guidelines from Intlekofer and Bracebridge. Employ-
ers should try to prevent harassment by adopting grievance proce-
dures covering sexual harassment. They should implement well-
communicated policies that condemn sexual harassment, educate 
their employees about unacceptable workplace behavior, and estab-
lish multi-stage remedial measures that are designed to punish con-
duct on the basis of the severity of conduct in question. 
In 1991, the EC adopted the EC Recommendation. 189 Its adoption 
suggests that the best way to prevent harassment is to deal with the 
problem before it occurs. A Code of Conduct that defines sexual 
harassment and sets forth guidelines for employers to follow accom-
panies the EC Recommendation. 190 
V. THE EC CODE OF CONDUCT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. The EC Definition of Sexual Harassment 
EC sexual harassment law has evolved slowly over a thirty-four year 
period, starting with the signing of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC Treaty or Treaty) 191 in 1957, and 
culminating in the passage of the EC Recommendation on sexual 
harassment in 1991. The stated purpose of the EEC Treaty is to 
promote the elimination of barriers to trade among member na-
tions. 192 To this end, article 7 of the Treaty prohibits discrimination 
between workers based on nationality.193 The Treaty, however, con-
tains no comparable prohibition against gender discrimination. 
In 1976, the EC passed the Equal Treatment Directive,194 which 
called on member nations to enact laws and regulations that guar-
188 Id. at 6. 
189 EEC Recommendation, supra note 6. 
190 Id. 
191 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY J. 
192 See generally EEC TREATY. 
193EEC TREATY art. 7. 
194 Council Directive 76/207, 1976 OJ. (L. 39) 40. 
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anteed the equal treatment of women and men at work. l95 As is the 
case with Title VII and the SDA, the Directive did not refer to sexual 
harassment. 196 In response to a major study on sexual harassment 
conducted for the EC,197 however, the EC Commission issued a 
Recommendation in November of 1991.198 The Recommendation 
condemns sexual harassment and urges companies to adopt a code 
of practice that ensures that "sexual harassment does not occur, and, 
if it does occur, ... that adequate procedures are readily available 
to deal with the problem and prevent its recurrence."199 
The Code of Conduct (Code), which is annexed to the Recom-
mendation, closely parallels the U.S. Guidelines. It defines harass-
ment as "unwanted conduct of a sexual nature . . . [including] 
unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct."2oo It also states 
that such conduct is unacceptable ifit "is used explicitly or implicitly 
as a basis for a decision which affects ... [an employee's job pros-
pects or status] and/or ... creates an intimidating, hostile or hu-
miliating working environment for the recipient.''201 Thus, the Code 
of Conduct prohibits both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
harassment. 
The Code of Conduct also states that conduct is unacceptable as 
long as it is "unwanted, unreasonable and offensive."202 These three 
factors are the subject of a great deal of dispute in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom. What standard should be applied 
to determine if a woman has welcomed the conduct in question? 
What test should be used to determine if the conduct under review 
is unreasonable or offensive? Like statutory law in the United States 
195EEC TREATY arts. 5(1)-(2), 9(1). 
196 Since the Equal Treatment Directive was passed in 1976, there have been several other 
actions taken by the EC that have paved the way for sexual harassment victims. For example, 
in 1984 a Council Recommendation was passed, which advised Member States to adopt "a 
positive action policy designed to eliminate existing inequalities affecting women in working 
life ... [and] to take steps to ensure that positive action includes ... respect for the dignity 
of women at the workplace .... "Council Recommendation of 13 Dec. 1984 On The Promo-
tion of Positive Action for Women, 1984 OJ. (L. 331) 34,35. In 1991, a Council Resolution 
passed that invited Member States to adopt national equality plans to, in part, "reduce barriers 
to women's ... participation in employment." Council Resolution of 21 May 1991 On The 
Third Medium-term Community Action Programme On Equal Opportunity For Women And 
Men (1991-1995), 1991 OJ. (C. 142) 1,2. Also, in 1991, the European Parliament passed a 
resolution which sought to ensure the dignity of men and women at work. EEC Recommen-
dation, supra note 6, at 2. 
197 See generally DIGNITY OF WOMEN, supra note 5. 
198EEC Recommendation, supra note 6, at 3. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 4. 
201Id. 
202ld. 
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and the United Kingdom, the Code of Conduct fails to take a 
definitive stand on these issues. 
On one hand, advocates for harassment victims can argue that 
the Code of Conduct encourages courts to use the reasonable 
woman/victim test. For example, the Code first states that "the 
essential characteristic of sexual harassment is that it is unwanted by 
the recipient."203 Because there is no similarly placed phrase in either 
the U.S. Guidelines or the U.K. Guidelines, the drafters arguably 
used the phrase, "by the recipient," to show that they endorsed the 
use of an evaluative standard that emphasizes the importance of the 
victim's perspective in harassment cases. On the other hand, advo-
cates for employers can contend that conduct only becomes harass-
ment under the Code after the victim tells her harasser that she finds 
his behavior offensive. The Code states that "sexual attention be-
comes sexual harassment if it is persisted in once it has been made 
clear that it is regarded by the recipient as offensive, although one 
incident of harassment may constitute sexual harassment if suf-
ficiently serious.''204 This language suggests that, short of out-right 
physical assault, a woman welcomes harassment unless she makes a 
verbal objection directly to her harasser. Thus, employer advocates 
might maintain that the Code's drafters really intended to endorse 
the use of the reasonable person/man test. 
Although the Recommendation later states that victims also have 
the option of resolving their disputes through more formal and less 
direct channels, it strongly encourages them first to try to talk 
informally and directly to their harassers.205 This provision fails to 
take into account why many women remain silent when they are 
harassed. They fear that they will suffer reprisals or further harass-
ment if they complain directly to their harassers, especially when 
those harassers are their supervisors. 
There is a risk that some judges will cite this part of the Code of 
Conduct to support the view that a woman's silence constitutes her 
acceptance of harassment. Such a view departs from fundamental 
common law principles that govern the formation of contracts. For 
example, under the general rules that govern the formation of 
contracts, silence generally does not constitute an acceptance of a 
contract offer under either U.S. or U.K. law.206 
203EEC Recommendation, supra note 6, at 4. 
204 [d. 
205 [d. at 6. 
206For U.S. law, see THOMAS DUNFEE, FRANK GIBSON, ET AL, MODERN BUSINESS LAW 279 
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The Code's drafters could have taken an alternative approach and 
emphasized the impropriety of certain delineated types of conduct, 
with the presumption being that such conduct is per se offensive 
unless a victim overtly states that she welcomes it. This, however, was 
not done. As a result, there is a strong possibility that courts will use 
the Code of Conduct to allow employers to escape culpability for 
harassment by blaming women for failing to be as aggressive as their 
harassers. 
Thus, there is a danger that courts will use the Code of Conduct 
to trivialize the experiences of harassment victims. Currently, there 
are only two U.K. sexual harassment cases that have referred to the 
EC Recommendation. One took a pro-employer approach and the 
other took a pro-victim approach. 
B. Employer Liability Under the EC Recommendation 
1. Possible Strict Liability for Supervisor Harassment 
The EC Recommendation does not make a definitive statement 
about employer liability.207 It merely suggests that there might be a 
relationship between supervisor quid pro quo harassment and em-
ployer liability.208 The Recommendation states that "since sexual 
harassment often entails an abuse of power, employers may have a 
responsibility for the misuse of the authority they delegate.''209 This 
statement is similar to the USEEOC's recommendations in the Meri-
torcase. Because of the open-ended nature in which it is made, U.K. 
courts will be able to avoid its implications if they chose to do so. 
2. The Importance of Taking Proactive Steps to Combat 
Harassment 
The SDA protects employers from liability if they take steps that 
are reasonably designed to stop sexual harassment. There is some 
dispute in the United Kingdom over whether this means that com-
panies simply need to punish harassers after the fact, or whether 
they need to go a step further and adopt more proactive measures. 
(Random House: 1989). For U.K. law, see HOLBORN LAw TUTORS, LLB-ELEMENTS OF THE 
LAw OF CONTRACT CASE BOOK 16 (London: 1986). 
207 See generally EEC Recommendation, supra note 6. 
208 Id. 
209/d. at 4 (emphasis added). 
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Some suggested measures are training programs and grievance pro-
cedures. 
The Code of Conduct suggests that the proactive approach is the 
more effective way to combat sexual harassment.210 The Code states 
that "employers have a responsibility to take steps to minimize the 
risk [of sexual harassment] as they do with any other hazards."2l1 
These steps include the development of a policy statement that 
makes it clear that harassment will not be tolerated, a training 
program that teaches employees and managers about the problem, 
a grievance procedure that ensures that complaints will be resolved 
in a fair and effective manner, and a disciplinary procedure that 
covers a range of potential penalties against harassers.212 While it is 
not mandatory that Member States "harmonize" the EC Recommen-
dation by passing it into law, there is a presumption that U.K.judges 
will rely on it in the same manner that U.S. judges rely on the U.S. 
Guidelines and U.K. judges rely on the U.K. Guidelines.213 
C. Recent UK Case Law References to the EC Recommendation 
The first two U.K. cases that refer to the EC Code of Conduct are 
Tofield v. Pollicino t/a Donnabella Hair Design214 and Donnelly v. Wat-
son Grange Ltd. 215 In Tofield, the plaintiff said that she was forced to 
quit her job after the company owner made masturbatory gestures 
in front of her and talked to her about personal sexual matters.216 
He also suggested that she appear nude in the newspaper.217 
At the industrial tribunal hearing, the owner belittled the plain-
tiffs complaints, said that she was untrustworthy, and accused her 
of stealing company products.218 The owner never, however, re-
ported any of his concerns to anyone before she filed her lawsuit. 219 
Concluding that the plaintiff was more credible than the defendant, 
210 ld. 
m ld. 
212EEC Recommendation, supra note 6, at 5-7. 
213 See Grimaldi v. Fonds Des Maladies Professionnelles, [1990] I.R.L.R. 400, 402 (article 
189(5) of the EEC Treaty binds domestic courts "to take ... Recommendations into consid-
eration in order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they are capable 
of clarifying the interpretation of other provisions of national or Community law."). 
214Indus. Trib. (Case No. 10862) (1992). 
215 Indus. Trib. (Case No. S/119) (1992). 
216Indus. Trib. (Case No. 10862) (1992). 
217 ld. at 1-6. 
218 ld. 
219 ld. at 4-5. 
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the court cited both the SDA and the Code of Conduct and ruled 
that the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff constituted illegal 
sexual harassm en t. 220 
In Donnelly v. Watson Grange Ltd., however, the industrial tribunal 
took a decidedly more anti-victim approach.221 It concluded that 
because the plaintiff had not objected sufficiently to being harassed, 
she was not entitled to any relief under either the SDA or the Code 
ofConduct.222 The plaintiff worked for a company as an export sales 
manager.223 She alleged that during her employment, her supervisor, 
a marketing manager, subjected her to a constant barrage of per-
sonalized and generalized comments of a sexual nature.224 She also 
said that he propositioned her and invited her to strip tease parties 
while they were traveling away on business.225 
The plaintiff initially only responded by remaining silent or saying 
"for goodness sakes."226 She did tell her parents about the problem, 
but said that she did not feel comfortable confiding about the 
problem to anyone at work.227 Finally, approximately eighteen 
months after the alleged harassment began, she said that she told 
her supervisor that she wanted his behavior to stop, but he contin-
ued to harass her.228 Six months later, he asked her to resign. 229 
The industrial tribunal cited the Code of Conduct to support its 
view that a victim's silence constitutes her acceptance of harass-
ment.230 The court said that: 
remarks of the type which have been listed reasonably 
could be totally unacceptable to a female employee, ... if 
she made the fact that it was unacceptable clear . .. even if the 
applicant's evidence had been accepted as entirely cred-
ible, it was not clear that she had made the fact that the 
22() [d. at 6. 
221 Indus. Trib. (Case No. S/119) (1992). 
222 [d. 
223 [d. 
224 [d. at 3. The plaintiff claimed that, among other things, her supervisor commented on 
his sexual prowess, her being a big girl, women being bits of crumpets, and how he would 
buy her a low-cut blouse. [d. 
225 Indus. Trib. (Case No. S/119) at 3-6. 
226 [d. at 4. 
227 [d. at 4-6. 
228 [d. at 5. 
229 [d. at 6. 
230 Indus. Trib. (Case No. S/119) at 18 (emphasis added). 
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behavior was unwanted clear .... [It appears that she had] 
freely and willingly taken part in the conversations.231 
The tribunal made this last statement without any reference to the 
fact that the plaintiff said that she did tell her supervisor to stop on 
one occasion.232 In addition, the tribunal failed to take into account 
the fact that no evidence was submitted to show that the company 
had a grievance procedure designed to deal with sexual harass-
ment. 233 The tribunal also failed to acknowledge the unequal power 
relationship that existed between the plaintiff and her supervisor.234 
In such relationships, the supervisor places his subordinate in the 
untenable position of having to choose between risking further 
harassment if she does not object, or risking retaliation if she does. 
Evidently, there is a chance that some U.K. judges will use the EC 
Code of Conduct to belittle the experiences of harassment victims. 
As has been the case with many of these issues, unless the Court of 
Appeal, Parliament, or the EC mandate that courts take the plight 
of harassment victims more seriously, the movement to combat sex-
ual harassment will remain in jeopardy. 
VI. REFORMING SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In order to combat sexual harassment more effectively, current 
legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom needs to 
be revised. This can be done if new legislation: (1) mandates that 
courts apply an evaluative standard that gives greater weight to 
victims' perspectives in order to determine whether conduct is wel-
comed, offensive, or unreasonable, (2) shields evidence about a 
plaintiff's non-contemporaneous sexually-charged speech or con-
duct from being admitted into evidence, (3) eliminates caps on the 
amount of damages that can be awarded to successful harassment 
complainants, (4) makes employers strictly liable for all supervisor 
harassment, and (5) requires companies to adopt training and griev-
ance procedures that are designed to inform employees about the 
nature of harassment and to prevent it from occurring. Explanations 
for the proposed reforms appear below. 
231 [d. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. 
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A. The Reasonable Woman/Victim Test Should Be Used To Evaluate 
Harassment Claims 
Much work has been done in the United States to document how 
workplace sexual harassment negatively affects women. Women tend 
to find conduct offensive that men find inoffensive. Women also 
often fear that they will be retaliated against or that the harassment 
will escalate if they tell their harassers to stop or complain to their 
superiors about it. Since women are by far the most common victims 
of sexual harassment, legislation needs to be passed that requires 
courts to use an evaluative standard that gives greater weight to the 
perspectives of women in harassment cases. 
The standard, among other things, would focus on the impropri-
ety of certain types of conduct. It also would acknowledge that a 
woman's silence does not constitute her acceptance of the conduct 
in question. The presumption would be that the conduct is per se 
offensive unless she expressly says that she welcomes it. 
By logical extension, such a standard could be used to determine 
the general perspective of any group that is victimized by harass-
ment. Thus, for example, a "reasonable victim test" could be simi-
larly applied to determine whether conduct is offensive to hetero-
sexual men, gay men, or lesbians who report harassment. For such 
a test to be effective, however, governments in the United States and 
the United Kingdom need to sponsor objectively-based statistical 
research that seeks to ascertain how sexual harassment affects dif-
ferent groups. 
Legislation in the United Kingdom also should require courts to 
rely more heavily on the results of such research. The research 
would continue and expand on the work pioneered by the sponsors 
of the 1981 Merit Report and the 1988 Merit Report. It also would 
have to be updated on a periodic basis. 
Some may object to the use of the new evaluative standard on the 
grounds that it too can be used to trivialize individual experiences 
that fall outside the range of experiences common to most harass-
ment victims. Others may criticize it because they may feel that its 
insistence on viewing men and women differently runs counter to 
the law, which states that men and women should be treated equally. 
Unfortunately, there is always the chance that the individual's needs 
will be subsumed by the needs of the group whenever conceptual-
ized notions of objectivity are used in the law. This, however, is one 
of the inherent risks associated with the rule of law. 
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Furthermore, it is also important that the underlying purpose of 
discrimination law not be forgotten-that attitudes and patterns 
of behavior that traditionally have kept certain groups from being 
treated equally must be addressed before full equality can be 
achieve·d. Thus, given the fact that a significant number of harass-
ment victims will benefit from the proposed standard, its use at least 
will move current dialogue about workplace equality in the right 
direction. 
B. A Plaintiff's Non-Contemporaneous Sexually-Charged Speech Or 
Conduct Should Not Be Used To Challenge Her Sexual 
Harassment Claim 
Evidence about a woman's non-contemporaneous sexually-
charged speech or conduct often is used to challenge her when she 
claims that she did not welcome such conduct, and that she found 
the conduct to be offensive. The relevancy of such speech or con-
duct is questionable, especially when it is not directed at the alleged 
harasser, or when it does not take place in his presence. The use of 
such evidence usually results in the victim being blamed in the same 
manner that a sexually-active rape victim is often blamed during the 
course of a rape trial,235 Legislation should be passed that prevents 
courts from using this kind of evidence in this manner. Such legis-
lation could be modeled on California's sexual harassment shield 
law. 
C. Damage Awards Should Not Be Subject To Statutory Limits 
Given the small amount of compensation that harassment victims 
are entitled to receive in the United Kingdom, the SDA's limits on 
damages should be lifted. Except for punitive damages, a victim 
should be entitled to receive a level of monetary relief that is equal 
to the degree of harm that she has suffered. Furthermore, the 
possibility of larger damage awards will motivate employers to take 
the problem of sexual harassment more seriously. Finally, since there 
are no limits placed on the amount of money damages that victims 
of racial and religious discrimination can receive in the United 
States, the Kennedy Bill's proposal to eliminate statutory caps on 
damages for victims of sex discrimination should be enacted. 
235 See Reasonable Woman Test, supra note 29, at 237 n.59. 
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Outside forces may compel D.K. legislators to eliminate their 
statutory limits on money damages, notwithstanding their tradi-
tional reluctance to do so. In a recent ruling by the European Court 
of Justice, the Court made it clear that such limitations run contrary 
to the Equal Treatment Directive when those limitations are applied 
to awards won by public sector employees. In Marshall v. Southamp-
ton Area Health Authority, 236 the European Court of Justice stated that 
such awards must be "'adequate, in that [they] must enable the loss 
or damage sustained ... to be made good in full."'237 Hopefully, D.K. 
legislators will seize the opportunity afforded them by the Southamp-
ton ruling and revise the SDA so that it eliminates statutory caps on 
awards for both public and private sector employees, as well as for 
sex and race discrimination cases.238 
D. Employers Should Be Strictly Liable For All Forms Of Supervisor 
Harassment 
Employers should be held to the highest standard of liability when 
supervisors engage in workplace sexual harassment. Because of the 
duties that employers delegate to supervisors, supervisors occupy a 
unique position of authority over lower level employees. They often 
have the power to hire and fire, and to promote and demote em-
ployees. Supervisors also have the power to affect the future employ-
ment prospects of employees because they are a traditional source 
of job references. 
When a supervisor makes lewd gestures or obscene remarks to a 
female employee, it is likely that her emotional well-being will be 
affected negatively. She may ask to take sick leave, seek an in-house 
job transfer or even look for a new job. Clearly, the impact of 
supervisor hostile environment harassment is just as "tangible" as 
any hiring, firing, or promotion decision would be. In the Dnited 
States, legislation should be adopted that requires courts to hold 
employers strictly liable for supervisor quid pro quo and hostile 
environment harassment. Because D.K. law currently does not dis-
tinguish between these two forms of harassment, D.K. legislation 
236 [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688. 
237 [d. 
238 Although technically, EC law mandates that the principles articulated by the Court of 
Justice in decisions like Southamptan must be enacted into U.K. law, the principle of "direct 
effect" would enable U.K. citizens to rely on the Court of Justice ruling in U.K. courts 
immediately. Napier, supra note 163, at 1185. 
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simply needs to mandate that courts hold employers strictly liable 
for all supervisor harassment. 
E. Employers Should Be Liable Ffff Co-womer Hostile Environment 
Harassment When Employers Fail To Trike Prompt And Effective 
Remedial Actions Against Co-wfffker-Harassers 
Since co-workers do not occupy the same position of power that 
supervisors occupy, the strict liability test should not apply to co-
worker harassment. Studies show that co-worker harassment is per-
vasive and occurs more frequently than supervisor harassment.239 
Co-worker harassment thus is the form of harassment that needs to 
be addressed by employers immediately. Legislation should require 
employers to take prompt and effective remedial actions against 
co-workers as soon as they know or should know that co-workers are 
engaging in sexual harassment. These actions should be commen-
surate with the level of severity of the harassment in question. 
More importantly, the legislation should state that the overall 
purpose of any remedial measure should be to stop harassment from 
continuing. The employer should not try to protect harassers by 
warning them informally when more serious measures would be 
more appropriate. Assuming that a company properly informs its 
employees that sexual harassment will not be tolerated, and imple-
ments a grievance process that enables employees to report harass-
ment, the company should not hesitate to penalize employees for 
engaging in prohibited conduct. 
As previously mentioned, companies should be held strictly liable 
for supervisor harassment. It also is recommended that they take 
prompt and appropriate remedial actions against supervisor-haras-
sers. Of course, given the more serious nature of supervisor harass-
ment, harsher penalties should be assessed against supervisor-haras-
sers. 
F. Employers Should Be Required To Establish Grievance Procedures 
And Training Programs That Are Designed To Prevent And Stop 
Harassment 
Both U.S. and U.K law require companies to take steps designed 
to prevent sexual harassment. Statutory law in neither country, how-
239 1988 Merit Repurt, supra note 1, at 3,12 (69% of the women surveyed reported that they 
had been harassed by a co-worker). 
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ever, specifically delineates what type of "steps" should be taken. As 
mentioned previously, case law in both countries is mixed with 
respect to this issue. Uniform national legislation should be adopted 
that acknowledges that the most effective way for a company to 
prevent sexual harassment is for it to establish grievance procedures 
and to educate employees about harassment. In the United States, 
proposed legislation already has been introduced in some states that 
would require companies to do this.240 Even if new legislation is not 
enacted, from an ethical perspective, multinational companies who 
do business in the United States and the United Kingdom should 
consider following the proposals recommended in this Section. 
Training programs should teach employees about the nature and 
effects of sexual harassment, the type of conduct that is prohibited, 
and the range of penalties that will be assessed against those who 
engage in harassing conduct. Such programs do not have to be 
costly to be effective. For small businesses, and those companies who 
lack sizable revenues, there are a host of small consulting firms and 
videotapes on the market that can be used to educate employees at 
an affordable price. 
Training on sexual harassment also will be more effective if it is 
included as part of a company's overall diversity education program. 
These programs should be conducted on a periodic basis. In addi-
tion, an employee's success or failure in meeting a company's sexual 
harassment policy goals should be discussed during that employee's 
semi-annual review. 
Perhaps most importantly, a company should work to make its 
employees feel that their concerns will be addressed in a fair and 
efficient manner. If employees know that grievance procedures are 
in place with these attributes, it is likely that disputes will be resolved 
in-house. Company grievance procedures, thus, should address the 
concerns of harassment victims. If a supervisor is the first person to 
review a harassment complaint, the employer should provide an 
alternate person to receive employee complaints concerning super-
visor harassment. Companies also should investigate complaints in 
a professional and confidential manner. 
240 See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Prevention Act of 1993. §§ 40-46. Program Bill No. 158R, 
New York (1993); see also An Act Relative To Sexual Harassment Education And Training In 
The Workplace, H.R.Res. 5559, Massachusetts (1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
Much has been done in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the EC to create a legal environment that encourages employers 
to protect the dignity of women at work by combatting sexual har-
assment. There is a danger, however, that progress in this direction 
will be thwarted both by legislators who are unwilling to pass laws 
that adequately address the concerns of harassment victims, and by 
judges who interpret those laws in a manner that trivializes the 
experiences of sexual harassment victims. If statutory reforms are 
enacted and employers take the appropriate steps to prevent harass-
ment, the momentum towards eliminating sexual harassment will be 
regained and women will have a real chance of achieving full equal-
ity in the workplace. 
